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100 _aDeuskar, Chandan
_954188
245 _aInformal urbanisation and clientelism: Measuring the global relationship/
_cChandan Deuskar
260 _bSage,
_c2020.
300 _aVol 57, issue 11, 2020: (2473–2490 p.)
520 _aThis paper uses newly released data on political behaviour and urban growth to identify, for the first time, a statistical correlation between clientelism (the informal provision of benefits, including urban land and services, to the poor in contingent exchange for political support) and informal urban growth, across a globally representative sample of 200 cities. The paper finds that, consistent with theoretical expectations, cities in more clientelistic countries are more likely to experience urban growth in the form of informal settlements that appear to have been planned in advance of settlement (‘informal subdivisions’), but are not necessarily more likely to experience unplanned, ad-hoc informal growth. The main model for informal subdivisions finds that if a country were less clientelistic by one point on a 0–10 scale in 1990, the proportion of residential growth in the form of informal subdivisions between 1990 and 2015 in its cities would decrease by 16% of its previous value, a magnitude equivalent to that of an increase in 1990 GDP per capita of US$2700, based on purchasing power parity (PPP). These results support the notion that informality is not simply associated with poverty but also with politics. They indicate that particular political dynamics may have a spatial ‘signature’ on the urban landscape; that, conversely, certain urban spatial forms may generate certain kinds of politics; or both. The paper provides an example of how newly available data may be used to advance our understanding of the relationship between politics, urban space and informality.
773 0 _08843
_916581
_dLondon Sage Publications Ltd. 1964
_tUrban studies
_x0042-0980
856 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1177/0042098019878334
942 _2ddc
_cART
999 _c13423
_d13423