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100			_aDarabi, Hassan _949011
245			_aIlluminating the formal–informal dichotomy in land development on the basis of transaction cost theory /
260			_bSage, _c2019.
300			_aVol 18, Issue 1, 2019 : (100-121 p.).
520			_aTransaction cost theory is largely used to investigate the formal domain of land and housing. In the informal domain, however, this perspective has been employed largely as a supplement in addressing the other fundamental notion in new institutional economics—property rights—despite the possibility that informality in land development can emerge regardless of the informality or formality of such rights. To cover this gap, this study developed a theoretical framework based on transaction cost theory to explain the formal–informal dichotomy in land development. The proposed framework maintains that land development depends on engaging in transactions that involve total or partial ownership of a combination of capital and land through lease and/or sale contracts, which enable landowners to earn from the new rental prices produced by the increase in land prices. Landowners are afforded two avenues from which to reduce transaction costs, namely, formal and informal institutional frameworks, each defining and enforcing restrictive rules on agents’ actions. These avenues, however, are simultaneously a source of new transaction costs that can affect the expected financial return of land development. Landowners therefore tend to choose the institutional framework that entails lower transaction costs but enables higher gains. Thus, the higher transaction costs associated with a formal institutional framework are the primary deterrents to the selection of this structure. In turn, informal land development continues to expand, regardless of the existence of formal prohibitive measures. We investigated the formal–informal dichotomy in the rural land development process in Tehran Province, Iran. The results indicated that transaction costs cause inefficiency in formal institutions, thereby driving the perpetuation of informal development
650			_aformal–informal dichotomy, _949012
650			_ainstitutional framework, _949013
650			_aIran, _949014
650			_a new institutional economics, _949015
650			_arural land development, _949016
650			_a transaction cost theory. _949017
700			_aJalali, Danon _949018
773	0		_08831 _916470 _dLondon Sage Publications Ltd. 2002 _tPlanning theory _x1473-0952
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1177/1473095218779111
942			_2ddc _cART
999			_c12390 _d12390