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008			200917b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aHenning, C. Randall _930350
245			_aRegime Complexity and the Institutions of Crisis and Development Finance
260			_bWiley _c2019.
300			_aVol 50, Issue 1,2019:(24-45 p.)
520			_aThe theory of regime complexity offers a useful lens through which to analyse the increasing density of international institutions and the patterns of conflict and cooperation among them. Scholarship on crisis and development finance would benefit from more fully employing this approach to explain the emergence of overlapping institutions and offer recommendations for designing regime complexes. The theory advanced here emphasizes the strategies of key states to use institutional overlap to limit agency ‘drift’ away from their preferences. Prioritizing control often comes at the cost of conflict among the institutions, however, and can thus impede the achievement of financial stability and development goals. The regime complexity approach is distinct from the rational design of institutions, institutional experimentalism and theoretical realism. Drawing on lessons from the euro crisis, this article offers informed conjectures on financial arrangements in the regions of Latin America and East Asia and their interaction with global multilateral institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund.
773	0		_08737 _915395 _dWest Sussex John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 1970 _tDevelopment and change _x0012-155X
856			_u https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12472
942			_2ddc _cART